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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

LEX AMERICANA: CONSTITUTIONAL DUE PROCESS AND THE
NUREMBERG DEFENDANTS*
JONATHAN A. BUSH**

I.

INTRODUCTION

1

Malinski v. New York is an obscure case about coercive interrogation and
multiple confessions from the era before the due process revolution of the
1960s. The prosecution conceded that the lead appellant had been stripped and
held naked for most of a day, put in fear, and subjected to multiple
interrogations. Malinski confessed and later confessed again in writing, and
the question before the Supreme Court was whether the second confession,
given a few days after the nude detention, could be used in evidence. The
Court reversed Malinski’s conviction, though not his co-defendant’s, reasoning
that even if the coercive setting did not rise to the level of abuse found in
Chambers v. Florida,2 it made the first confession involuntary and tainted the
second.3 With facts typical of the Court’s coercion cases a generation before
Miranda v. Arizona,4 and with a tame majority opinion by Justice William O.
Douglas, Malinski would appear to be an unremarkable case. On one level,
Malinski’s only unusual feature is Justice Frank Murphy’s pointed criticism of
the New York prosecutor for his casual anti-Semitism: words from a time
capsule.5
If Malinski is remembered at all for its law, it is for the odd concurrence by
Justice Felix Frankfurter emphasizing the error of “[a] construction which
gives due process no independent function but makes of it a summary of the

* © Jonathan A. Bush 2001.
** Fellow, Center for Scholars and Writers, New York Public Library. The author wishes to
thank Peter Gay and Dorothy and Lewis Cullman for creating the wonderful scholarly oasis that
is the Center for Scholars and Writers, and Lisa Lang for everything else.
1. 324 U.S. 401, 403-04 (1945).
2. 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
3. Malinski, 324 U.S. at 410.
4. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Malinski, 324 U.S. at 433-34 (Murphy, J., dissenting in part).
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specific provisions of the Bill of Rights . . . .”6 Like a star whose elliptical
orbit is affected by a nearby black hole, Frankfurter’s argument revolved not
around anything in Douglas’ bland opinion, but in opposition to a
memorandum circulated by Justice Hugo Black. Black may have been
preparing to use Malinski as the vehicle for his famous argument that the
Fourteenth Amendment, and especially its due process clause, incorporated all
constitutional rights found in the Bill of Rights and made them applicable to
state criminal justice. Having considered his novel incorporation argument
almost since arriving on the Court, Black must have felt that the time or
occasion was not right for the full-dress version of the incorporation argument,
and he did not write in Malinski, nor two years later when the possibility
presented itself again in Louisiana ex rel. Francis v Resweber.7 But
Frankfurter chose to include his reply to Black’s memorandum in the Malinski
concurrence, thus sharing with the world one side in what otherwise remained
largely an internal debate.
Late in the 1946 term, Justice Black went public with incorporation in his
famous dissent in Adamson v. California.8 At the time, it seemed to convince
almost no one, certainly not a sufficient number of his Adamson brethren, and
in general not even his closest allies.9 Soon after, the leading Supreme Court
historian of the day savaged the historical basis of Black’s position.10 For
fifteen years Black had only isolated victories to show for his incorporation
argument,11 and as late as 1959 Frankfurter sought occasion to drive a stake

6. Id. at 415 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See also HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX
FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH 156-57 (1960) (discussing Justice Frankfurter’s
Malinski concurrence).
7. 329 U.S. 459 (1947). See MARK SILVERSTEIN, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITHS: FELIX
FRANKFURTER, HUGO BLACK, AND THE PROCESS OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 138 (1984)
(noting that Justice Black explored the incorporation approach as early as 1939). See also id. at
157-58 (discussing Justice Black’s Malinski memorandum); id. at 159-62 (discussing Justice
Black’s unpublished Francis concurrence); Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 474-75 (1942) (Black,
J., dissenting) (Black advancing incorporation argument). But see THOMAS, supra note 6, at 156
(suggesting Frankfurter was replying in Malinski to innuendos in Douglas’s opinion, rather than
to Black’s memorandum).
8. 332 U.S. 46, 68 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
9. J. WOODFORD HOWARD, JR., MR. JUSTICE MURPHY: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 441
(1968) (quoting Murphy writing his law clerk: “It is hard for me to agree with all that Hugo
writes. He may be right, but I doubt it.”); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 167-69 (discussing
Murphy’s skepticism).
10. Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).
11. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (incorporating the Fourth Amendment and making
it applicable to the states, but without the federal exclusionary rule).
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through it.12 Then, in the early 1960s, and especially after Frankfurter’s
retirement in 1962, the Court began consistently to hold that the Constitution
incorporated each constitutional protection in the Bill of Rights to apply
against the states, and to the same extent that it applied against the federal
government.13 By the end of the Warren Court, almost every clause in the Bill
of Rights pertaining to the criminal process was deemed incorporated. Black’s
victory was complete.
Like most victories, it came with a dark lining. For one thing, Justice
Black had been forced to wait so long—until the second half or the third
phase14 of the Warren Court, almost the end of his judicial career. For another,
many of the incorporation cases were close majorities.15 As a result, not only
were they controversial, but they were also vulnerable to later retrenchment or
reversal. One leading case was immediately bypassed and soon limited to its
own facts,16 and in the run-up to the best known case of all, Miranda, skillful
judicial maneuvering was required in order to fend off an alternative proposal
being prepared under the auspices of the American Law Institute by
sympathizers of Frankfurter.17 In some instances, Black saw the Court bypass
incorporation to reach a liberal result that Black felt could not be justified by
incorporation theory.18 Elsewhere, Black’s incorporation victories came
burdened with concurrences by Harlan, still resisting the reasoning if not the
result.19 And right down to the end, even justices and scholars sympathetic to
the due process revolution denied Black the crown of his victory by insisting
12. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 124-29 (1959); SILVERSTEIN, supra note 7, at 170-71
n.107 (discussing Frankfurter’s continuing desire to bury the total incorporation theory once and
for all).
13. The literature on the Warren Court’s rulings in the area of criminal law and procedure is
voluminous. The classic work is FRED P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLUTION: THE
WARREN COURT’S IMPACT ON CRIMINAL LAW (1970) (originally published as THE SELFINFLICTED WOUND). See also CRAIG M. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE REVOLUTION 6-36 (1993). Fresh insights are found in the newest study, LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 379-444 (2000).
14. The periodization belongs to Russell H. Galloway, Jr., The Third Period of the Warren
Court: Liberal Dominance (1962-1969), 20 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 773 (1980).
15. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964);
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
16. Bypassed by Miranda, the Escobedo holding was soon minimized into insignificance.
See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (Stewart, J., plurality opinion) (explaining that
“the Court has limited the holding of Escobedo to its own facts . . .”); YALE KAMISAR, POLICE
INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS: ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 87-88, 162-63 (1980).
17. See description in POWE, supra note 13, at 392-94.
18. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 559-60 (1965) (Warren, C.J., concurring, with Douglas, J.
and Goldberg, J.) (stating that regardless of whether incorporation rationale fits the case, due
process requires and will be employed to justify reversal of conviction tainted by television
publicity).
19. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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that total incorporation was still wrong and that all the Court was doing was
selectively incorporating each protection.20
But these were quibbles. Incorporation became the dominant rationale in
criminal procedure, eclipsing the fundamental fairness or independent or freestanding due process theory that Frankfurter was advancing in Malinski. So
thoroughly entrenched had Black’s reasoning become that even when the
Burger or Rehnquist Courts frequently ruled against constitutional claims in
criminal procedure, they did so not by reversing Black-inspired incorporations,
but by finding loopholes, exceptions, high thresholds, low waiver standards, or
harmless error. For the moment, whatever its faults as demonstrated by
history, and however incongruous it seems when harnessed to recent narrow
constitutional rulings, the rhetorical logic of Black’s incorporation theory that
the Bill of Rights should apply to state as well as federal settings is simply too
powerful to undo.
While the incorporation theory has flourished, its predecessor and rival, the
independent due process theory, has been unable to shake its present low
esteem among judges and academic observers. In part, this is because of its
resemblance to substantive due process in other, non-criminal contexts—the
Lochner problem.21 It is also due to memories of the way fundamental fairness
theory was often used in the 1950s to limit judicial scrutiny of even pretty
unappetizing state criminal practices—the Irvine problem.22 Not least,
independent due process has languished because of its particular association
with Frankfurter himself, whose difficult personality soured relations with
broadly admired colleagues and who is widely, and not entirely fairly, blamed
for equivocating on race and civil liberties issues—the Frankfurter problem.
Whatever the reason, free-standing due process in criminal procedure is a
theory whose time is widely felt to have come and gone, with few to mourn
it.23 Perhaps Professor Israel’s essay24 in this issue of the Saint Louis
University Law Journal will be a first step in the revitalization of the doctrine.
In the following short essay, I will attempt a modest rehabilitation of the
incorporation doctrine, and to do so I will rely on a seemingly remote example.
20. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 12-14, 19-21, 27-28, 39 (1967) (relying on independent due
process); see also id. at 21 (citing Frankfurter’s concurring opinion in Malinski). For tweaking of
Black by his allies, see LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 253-54 (1990). Black’s
benign public response to his allies’ selective incorporation doctrine is quoted in GRAHAM, supra
note 13, at 55-56.
21. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
22. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
23. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & NANCY J. KING, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §
2.7(a) (3d ed. 2000) (noting “the Court’s description of free-standing due process as having only
‘limited operation,’ with fundamental fairness infractions defined ‘very narrowly,’ . . .” though
disagreeing with the accuracy of the Court’s characterization).
24. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process in Criminal Procedure: The Supreme
Court’s Development of Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303 (2001).
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At the same time as Malinski, in the late winter of 1945, another group of
American lawyers was contemplating how to define a criminal process that
would also embody basic norms of due process. In other words, the lawyers
were attempting to define and implement the same notions that Frankfurter
spoke of in Malinski. The setting was again Washington, where plans were
being drafted for the war crimes trials that would soon be negotiated in London
and begun in Nuremberg. The drafters were devising a wholly new legal
institution, and in doing so they were not bound by the considerations of
federalism and precedent. But if they were freed from those constraints, they
were subject to another, for they knew that whatever trials were held would be
subject to the closest legal and political scrutiny. In short, the drafters’ task
was to devise a court that was practical but manifestly fair, and they were
writing on essentially a blank slate. The results of their drafting efforts, along
with the later interpretative gloss of the judges, are the subject of this essay.
It is not the aim of this paper to examine systematically the procedural
issues of the fourteen American-inspired Nuremberg-related trials. Nor is the
aim to compare the procedure at the Nuremberg trials with contemporary
American criminal procedure or with current international war crimes trials in
The Hague and elsewhere. Finally, it is not the purpose to assert a causal
connection between due process at Nuremberg and constitutional
developments at home in the late 1940s. Indeed, with a few exceptions,25 it is
unlikely that there are causal connections, especially in the area of procedural
fairness.
The aim here is simpler. After a brief survey of the Nuremberg and related
tribunals in Part II, I will present in Part III a discussion of a few significant
procedural features of the war crimes trials. The aim is to draw from the
Nuremberg procedure a few generalizations about the contours of free-standing
due process in the same period at home, and to suggest that to contemporaries,
even to allies of Frankfurter, notably United States chief prosecutor Robert H.
Jackson, free-standing due process was capable of bearing considerably more
weight than it carried in the emerging Supreme Court jurisprudence.

25. Justice Jackson frequently commented on the deep impact Nuremberg made on him.
See, e.g., Robert H. Jackson, Introduction to WHITNEY R. HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE
EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG xxxvii (1954) (describing Nuremberg as “the most important,
enduring, and constructive work of my life”). Certainly the trial experience had a deep impact on
Justice Jackson himself, especially in his First Amendment jurisprudence. See Terminiello v.
Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,
314 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting); JEFFREY D. HOCKETT, NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER, AND ROBERT H.
JACKSON 267-81 (1996) (discussing the impact of the Nuremberg experience on principally
Jackson’s First Amendment jurisprudence, but explaining that the influence, if any, on other
judges or on criminal procedure doctrines is harder to identify).
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II. THE NUREMBERG BACKGROUND
The trials under consideration here were but fourteen of the thousands of
trials held after the Second World War for Nazis, Japanese war criminals, and
local collaborators in both the European and Asian theaters. The stakes in
these various post-war trials were often enormous and the wrongs under review
staggering in scope and horror. But the legal framework was almost always
straightforward. Trials were conducted either by victorious belligerents
relying on their national military codes, embodying their version of the laws of
land or naval warfare, or by liberated nations employing treason or other
criminal statutes or emergency decrees. Neither military nor liberated-nation
trials required a new legal framework, and both were amply supported by
historical precedent and international law. For its part, the United States held
its share of military trials under the authority of the Judge Advocate General,
many on the site of liberated Nazi concentration camp Dachau and others on
only slightly less notorious Japanese and German facilities. Overall,
proceedings were held in dozens of countries, starting immediately after
liberation, with passions still high, and continuing years after, with elderly
participants and unhurried process.26 We will never have accurate numbers of
how many trials were held in all. We only know that they were based on old
law of some sort, and so did not require new formulations of due process.
But for a handful of the highest-level perpetrators, Hitler and Mussolini
and Goering and Tojo, the legal situation was different. For one thing, every
victim nation had been harmed by the perpetrators’ deeds and, it was assumed,
each nation wanted to be a part of post-war judicial reckoning. For another
thing, the familiar tools of national and military law may not have been
adequate to reach these leaders. If they were not uniformed personnel (subject
to the military law of the victorious belligerents), and were not nationals of
liberated nations or had not personally committed acts in those nations (subject
to the law, say, of Norway or Poland), and if in the case of the German leaders,
they had complied with or even formulated, rather than broken, German law
(that is, if they were senior German officials rather than low-level killers), it
was difficult to see how familiar tribunals could reach them. So, as planning
for post-war settlement gained momentum during the war, the Allies began by
1942-43 to contemplate special provisions for “the case of the major criminals

26. Professor Howard Levie collected many of the more important cases in HOWARD S.
LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR: THE LAW OF WAR CRIMES (1993). A recent collection of studies
examining the context of trials in a handful of liberated nations is THE POLITICS OF RETRIBUTION
IN EUROPE: WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH (István Deák, Jan T. Gross, & Tony Judt eds.,
2000). The most complete survey of trials in the Far Eastern theater is PHILIP R. PICCIGALLO,
THE JAPANESE ON TRIAL: ALLIED WAR CRIMES OPERATIONS IN THE EAST, 1945-1951 (1979).
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whose offense have no particular location and who will be punished by a joint
decision of the Governments of the Allies.”27
The result of this broad distinction was a series of trials of major criminals
by newly constituted international tribunals: a four-power trial at Nuremberg
(1945-46) at which twenty-two individuals and six organizations were tried;
twelve subsequent American trials at Nuremberg (1946-49) trying some 185
Germans grouped according to type of offense (SS, law, medicine, heavy
industry, foreign ministry, banking and military high command); a series of
French trials at Rastatt in French-occupied Saarland (1946-48) trying low and
mid-level military personnel and a single industrial concern for use of French
slave labor; and the eleven-power trial at Tokyo (1946-48) trying twenty-five
senior military and political figures immediately below the emperor.28 All four
programs have been the subject of considerable academic study, and it is not
the purpose here to add to that literature. For present purposes, all that matters
is the international character of each of these proceedings. In legal
contemplation, the three European programs were the result of international
negotiation and were governed by international instruments. The first
Nuremberg, Rastatt and Tokyo trials had an international cast of judges, and all
four programs had the participation of an international staff of investigators,
researchers and lawyers, both prosecution and to an extent defense. When
various appeals and petitions were taken from the American Nuremberg
tribunals to federal courts in Washington, those courts were right to recognize
the international character of the proceedings and reject American review.29
That said, on another level these trial programs bear the deep impress of
American participation and American legal norms. We know a great deal
about the genesis of these trials. The eventual picture of Allied post-war
cooperation grew inauspiciously out of initial British hostility in 1941 to the
demands of the wartime governments-in-exile for post-war trials, through the
ineffectual wartime activities in London of the official United Nations War
Crimes Commission, down to continuing British ministerial reluctance as late
27. The last paragraph of the so-called Moscow Declaration, Conference of Foreign
Ministers, Nov. 1, 1943, is cited in such official war crimes series as REPORT OF ROBERT H.
JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
MILITARY TRIALS 11-12 (1949) (“Red Series”). An annotated version is given in THE
AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG: THE DOCUMENTARY RECORD, 1944-1945, at 13-14, 221
(Bradley F. Smith ed., 1982).
28. A survey of all four programs is found in LEVIE, supra note 26, at 45-98, 115-16, 14155. For additional information on the two lesser known programs, see TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUERNBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949) [hereinafter TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT]; YVELINE
PENDARIES, LES PROCÈS DE RASTATT (1946-1954) (1995).
29. Flick v. Johnson, 174 F.2d 983, 986 (D.C. Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 879 (1949),
reh’g denied, 338 U.S. 940 (1950). Other summary dismissals are cited in K. Brandt v. United
States, 333 U.S. 836 (1948) and Milch v. United States, 332 U.S. 789 (1947).
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as the spring of 1945.30 We know that neither British nor American military
lawyers offered practical legal help in the difficult problem of handling toplevel civilian perpetrators. As for the contributions of the other two major
powers, it is simplistic but not inaccurate to say that the French seem to have
been content just to be included among the Big Four victorious powers with
the opportunity to punish offenders against French victims, and the Soviets
were agreeable to any plan that would lead to the punishment of Nazis. The
road to Nuremberg led essentially through Washington.
Historians have been able to reconstruct an almost day-by-day record of
the work of these Washington planners.31 The various contributions of Henry
Stimson, Samuel Rosenman, Francis Biddle, Herbert Wechsler, Ammi Cutter
and John McCloy are known, and the important innovations of second-tier
officials like Murray Bernays and William Chanler have been retrieved from
obscurity. We know who devised each of the characteristic American features
of the Nuremberg trials—not only common law procedure, but conspiracy,
organizational guilt, aggressive war and crimes against humanity, and what
arguments they used to convince skeptics. We also know that in almost every
draft and explanatory memorandum, they included discussion of the elements
of fairness and due process as necessary elements for American participation in
a tribunal.32
In the summer of 1945, after V-E Day and the immediate stabilization of
Germany, war crimes planning moved to London, where representatives of the
four major victors gathered from late June to early August to negotiate the
ground rules and legal charter for what would be the first Nuremberg trial.
Even more is known about these negotiations, for in addition to the manuscript
notes of various delegates, we have the published contemporaneous notes
collected by the personal secretary to Justice Robert H. Jackson, President
Truman’s plenipotentiary for war crimes issues and chief American delegate at
the conference.33 The notes show that the major sticking points at the London
negotiations had to do with the substantive definition of crimes, venue,
presidency of the judicial panel, and selection of particular defendants.34 Trial
30. See, e.g., TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A PERSONAL
MEMOIR 26-33, 40, 45-46 (1992) [hereinafter TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY]; UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF WAR (1948); ARIEH J. KOCHAVI, PRELUDE TO NUREMBERG:
ALLIED WAR CRIMES POLICY AND THE QUESTION OF PUNISHMENT (1998).
31. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 33-42; BRADLEY F. SMITH, THE ROAD TO
NUREMBERG (1981); Sidney S. Alderman, Negotiating on War Crimes Prosecutions, 1945, in
NEGOTIATING WITH THE RUSSIANS 49, 54-56, 79 (Raymond Dennett & Joseph E. Johnson eds.,
1951) (emphasizing the distinctive features of the so-called American plan).
32. See TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 45-46.
33. See REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27.
34. Legal issues at the London negotiations included: different definitions of the crime of
aggressive war, see REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 293-309, 312-17, 327,
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procedure was particularly important to Jackson, and he repeatedly made clear
that both American legal standards and public opinion demanded fair trials.35
But specific procedural points were handled with dispatch. Occasionally
uncertainty arose concerning how to harmonize Anglo-American trial
procedure with the civil law procedure more familiar to the French and
Soviets, as well as the Germans. These issues were readily resolved, typically
along common law lines, and the results embodied in the so-called “London
Agreement” that created the first Nuremberg tribunal, the International
Military Tribunal (IMT).36
The three trial programs that followed the IMT have predictably been the
subject of less scholarly energy, and in examining their origins we lack the full
record of published memoranda and minutes corresponding to the London
material. But even the organic acts establishing the Tokyo trial (a
proclamation to the various Far East Allies from the American Supreme
Commander of the theater, General Douglas MacArthur),37 and the two
occupation-zone programs at Nuremberg and Rastatt (both authorized by
Control Council Law No. 10 between the four occupying powers in
Germany)38 show that the framers of these tribunals recognized the need to
329-37, 359, 363, 373-75, 380-95; the structure on the indictment, id. at 79-80, 153-54, 271; the
appointment of the judges, id. at 214-15; the presidency of the bench, id. at 73, 233; whether a
defendant might testify and be cross-examined, id. at 257, 262-64; the autonomy of each nation’s
prosecution team, id. at 152, 254, 288, 321-22; in absentia defendants, id. at 246; the location of
the trials and the administrative headquarters of the court, id. at 143, 149, 157, 277-78, 279-81,
340-41, 365; the blending of civil and common law procedure, id. at 78, 115-16; the treatment of
witnesses, id. at 282, 403-04; and the rendition of suspects, id. at 145-48, 158-59.
35. For example, see Justice Jackson’s remarks the need for or worrying about fairness and
perceived fairness at the planned trials, REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 84,
102, 150, 158, 266, 284, 336, 389, 408; see TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 49, 53,
59; Alderman, supra note 31, at 60-79. For comments to the same effect prior to the London
Conference, see THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 27, at 158-59, 167-71, 190,
196, 206-07.
36. Charter of the International Military Tribunal Annexed to the London Agreement, Aug.
8, 1945 [hereinafter London Agreement], reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra
note 27, at 420-29 (charter and protocol only); 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 10-18
[hereinafter TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS] (“Green Series”). For text with commentary, see
LEVIE, supra note 26, at 54-69 (commentary), 549-58 (text of charter and protocol only). The
rules of court, adopted 29 October 1945, are published in various war crimes official reports, such
as 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 18-22.
37. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, Jan. 19, 1946
[hereinafter Tokyo Charter], reprinted in 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 121823, 1224-27. Both charter as amended and court rules are also reprinted in LEVIE, supra note 26,
at 141-55 (commentary), 571-77 (text).
38. Control Council Law No. 10 (Dec. 20, 1945), officially reprinted in TAYLOR, FINAL
REPORT, supra note 28, at 6-10 (commentary), 250-53 (text); 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS,
supra note 36, at 23-28. The American implementing legislation, Ordinance No. 7, dated Oct.
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define the courts, their jurisdiction and fair procedures for the defendants.
While the French tribunal at Rastatt inevitably adopted French trial procedure,
the other two international programs, at Tokyo and the second round of trials at
Nuremberg, were planned along familiarly American lines.
As for the four trial programs that were ultimately held pursuant to these
three international agreements, they followed in the direction contemplated by
the drafters, with a careful focus on procedural fairness. To be clear, I am not
arguing that all, most, or any war crimes judicial rulings came out “right” or
were conformable with American constitutional law of that day or this. The
point here is only that the American war crimes planners, prosecutors and
judges who participated in and for the most part led these programs (aside from
Rastatt) consistently tried, by their lights, to anchor their activities closely to
what they understood to be the requirements of an American fair trial. The
judges in particular, almost all of them, kept their trials focused on familiar
issues of fairness and rights at least as much as on larger issues of political
history and persecution. In the following discussion, I shall use a small portion
of the published pre-trial and trial evidence to make a few generalizations
about what American lawyers thought they ought to do and were obliged to do
in conducting fair trials abroad, and to ask why it matters.
III. AMERICAN DUE PROCESS AT THE TRIALS
A key planning memorandum from January 1945, issued in the name of
the Secretaries of State and War and the Attorney General, stated that
American policy should be that international war crimes trials were to have
streamlined, simplified procedure that avoided legal niceties.39 As the creation
of victors in war, any tribunal was itself an act of grace, one that might embody
as many or few rights as the victors chose to give it. On a more practical basis,
the fear was that a court freighted with the due process paraphernalia of
domestic courts would be ineffectual. Worse, as British planners worried, a
proper legal court might result in widespread exonerations and a propaganda
debacle, much as had occurred with war crimes trials after World War I.40 All
this seemed obvious, and so the need for a summary court with streamlined,
18, 1946, is reprinted in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 286-91, and 15 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 28-35. Both charter as amended and court rules are reprinted
in LEVIE, supra note 26, at 558-70.
39. Memorandum for the President: Trial and Punishment of Nazi War Criminals, January
22, 1945, in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 3-9; THE AMERICAN ROAD TO
NUREMBERG, supra note 27, at 117-22 (text), 55-56, 238-39 (commentary). The continuing
emphasis on speedy, efficient procedure is found in both minutes and subsequent drafts. See,
e.g., THE AMERICAN ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 27, at 77, 115, 121, 127-28, 145, 148,
154, 155, 165, 178; REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 66, 113, 126, 212, 270,
339.
40. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 29.
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effective procedure was reiterated in negotiations and draft proposals in the
summer 1945 London conference. Streamlined procedure was retained in
softened form in the final version of the London Agreement, and then was
carried over into both Control Council Law No. 10 and the Tokyo Charter.41
Not that military trials needed explicit reservation or international agreement
under American law to authorize the use of summary (sometimes very
summary) procedure. The Supreme Court had recently reiterated that only
minimal standards of due process need be followed in so-called military
commissions convened even on American soil under the traditional laws of
war to try certain types of enemy offenders (in the Saboteurs Case).42 It was to
stand by that ruling again soon after the war in declining to review the flawed
trial of General Yamashita and dozens of lesser-known military-law trials
conducted overseas.43
Yet, having made sure to include in each charter language responding to
the concern that due process standards might cripple war crimes trials, the
drafters of each of the three instruments (London Agreement, Tokyo Charter
and Control Council Law No. 10 with its American Ordinance No. 7) assumed
and accepted that courts would be staffed by independent judges, applying
civilian legal standards and ensuring their institutional independence by
adopting additional, detailed court rules. Together, the three court charters and
the subordinate court rules, along with the bench rulings interpreting their
charters and rules, embody a clear vision of familiar due process for criminal
trials.
Under the three trial charters and subordinate rules, the architects of the
war crimes trials required charging documents that gave defendants fair notice
and identified the charges with sufficient particularity, even though this latter
requirement took some compromise prior to the first trial between prosecutors
from common law and civil law traditions. They set up courts with
independent judges; they guaranteed defendants the right to counsel of their
choice and the opportunity to hear, object to, and rebut evidence against them,
and to present their own evidence; they permitted the defendants the right
personally to testify, and the right not to testify; and they gave judges the

41. London Agreement, supra note 36, Art.18-19; Ordinance No. 7, supra note 38, Art. VIVII; Tokyo Charter, supra note 37, Art. 12.
42. United States ex rel. Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
43. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946). See also Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948)
(Douglas, J., concurring), 335 U.S. 876 (1948) (Jackson, J., mem.), reh’g denied, 335 U.S. 906
(1949); Homma v. Peterson, 327 U.S. 759 (1946) (other denials to cases from Far Eastern theater,
both international tribunal and military commission cases). See supra note 29 (comparable
holdings for cases from European theater).
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power to compel evidence, both against and for the defendants.44 Even at the
most general level, the picture of due process looks both reasonably fair and
familiar.
In fact, the new tribunals’ charters gave defendants many rights that went
beyond anything allowed in the American system, federal or state. For
example, defendants in the second round of Nuremberg trials were given the
right to be present with counsel both at depositions taken of witnesses
unavailable for trial and, remarkably, also at interrogations of prospective
prosecution witnesses who were being detained by the Allies (as possible
defendants in later trials or as protected informants).45 There indeed may be
tactical advantages for a prosecutor to be able to confront a defendant with
possible evidence against him and provoke a reaction implicating either the
defendant or the witness, but the advantage is hardly so great that prosecutors
want to allow all defendants presence in witness interrogations as of right.
More likely, a defendant’s presence will allow him to discover the evidence
against which he has to prepare. For that reason, no American jurisdiction
permits anything of the sort as of right.
Another Nuremberg procedure that went beyond anything allowed at home
was the defendants’ right to address the court if they wished, freely, not under
oath, and not subject to cross-examination, at the close of proceedings, in
addition to the right to give sworn testimony and to have counsel make a
closing argument.46 These unsworn statements were not wholly unknown to
the common law, but almost so. Only Georgia of the then forty-eight
American states and a handful of other common law jurisdictions permitted
unsworn statements in 1945, and in the years to come, where the right had not
lapsed into desuetude, it was abolished save only in a few Australian states.47
Significantly, where unsworn statements were allowed at common law, the
right was historically in lieu of the defendant’s right to testify under oath. At
Nuremberg, the cobbling together of common law procedure with some
elements of civil law (which did allow unsworn statements) meant that
defendants had three separate opportunities to speak to the court: as witness,
through counsel’s closing argument, and through the unsworn personal closing

44. See London Agreement, supra note 36, Art. 16; Ordinance No. 7, supra note 38, Art. IV;
Tokyo Charter, supra note 37, Art. 9. But see PICCIGALLO, supra note 26, at 14 (stressing British
as well as American contribution to Tokyo indictment).
45. 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 63-64, 66-67. See TAYLOR, FINAL
REPORT, supra note 28, at 56 (observing that in late 1947 and early 1948 many defense witnesses
preferred waiting in the Nuremberg jail to leaving, for their prospects might be either extradition
to face trial or denazification proceedings).
46. [NEW SOUTH WALES] LAW REFORM COMMISSION, UNSWORN STATEMENTS OF
ACCUSED PERSONS: REPORT NO. 45, at 13, 22, 32 (1985); Alderman, supra note 31, at 49, 67
(citing Taylor v. Georgia, 315 U.S. 25, 28 (1942)).
47. Id.
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statement. In two trials, a few defendants were even given a fourth opportunity
when the bench ruled the defendants possessed such unusual expertise that
they, in addition to their counsel, should be permitted to cross-examine certain
of the prosecution’s expert witnesses.48
Other rights not commonly given at home included a remarkably broad
guarantee of appointed counsel of one’s choice. At home, the Supreme Court
had read due process as ensuring counsel to all defendants in capital cases,49
which the Nuremberg cases also were. But counsel for indigents, then and
now, meant court-appointed, usually overworked and underpaid, and in death
penalty cases sometimes stunningly inept representation. At Nuremberg,
defendants (all of whom were indigent, since even formerly wealthy
industrialists held currency, legal title, shares and so forth from a defunct
regime whose legal guarantees at least provisionally were worthless) were
allowed to select counsel of their choice from anywhere in Germany.
Comparisons with indigent or frozen-asset defendants today are inapt, since
most lawyers in war-ravaged Germany were indigent too. The attraction of
American compensation and canteen privileges, along with sympathy for the
German lost cause, proved compelling, and few lawyers turned down inquiries
from Nuremberg defendants. The accused chose their counsel well, drawing
from the ranks of the leading practitioners and academic lawyers. In the
Tokyo and subsequent Nuremberg trials a defendants chose two and even three
lawyers each. Nor was there a political litmus test for defense counsel. In the
European theater, most of the defense lawyers had been at least nominal Nazis,
and some more active than that. The court secretariat tried not to advertise the
availability of Nazi lawyers, but turned down no requests on that ground. The
only limit placed by the Nuremberg tribunal was, for obvious reasons, on
lawyers who covered up their past or were themselves possible candidates for
war crimes trials or denazification proceedings.50 Nuremberg defendants also
48. 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 342-52. See also id. at 710 (permitting
counsel to call another defense lawyer as a witness).
49. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
50. TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 29-30, 47-49, 86, 87, 297-344 (providing
numbers, description and treatment of defense lawyers; list of names and resumes); TAYLOR, THE
ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 627. For isolated episodes where the Allies denied defendants their
chosen counsel, see 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 329-36 (refusal to permit
participation of Earl Carroll, Esq., on Krupp defense team); BRADLEY F. SMITH, REACHING
JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG 157 (1977) (noting that early in the IMT, two groups of senior
German generals, not charged individually at the IMT but likely members of the organizational
defendant “General Staff and High Command” secretly petition the court to drop their talented
court-appointed civilian lawyer and be represented instead by an Army general; motions denied);
ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 83 (1983) (Doenitz requests British or American
admiral as defense counsel in event Otto Kranzbuehler unavailable; Rosenberg requests codefendant Hans Frank as his defense counsel). For examples of the German bar’s ambivalence
toward or rejection of Nuremberg defendants, see id. at 81, 84, 86 n.*; EUGENE DAVIDSON, THE
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were permitted to waive potential conflicts and select joint counsel; thus, able
defense lawyers like Dix, Kranzbuehler and Seidl were in demand and handled
multiple defendants in a single case.51
A final illustration of due process rights exceeding anything at home was
defendants’ access to documents. At home, criminal law was still described by
the old analogies to a game or a fox-hunt in which each side was left to its own
resources and enjoyed almost no right to discovery of the other side’s
The framework for modern federal criminal discovery
evidence.52
(“Jencks,”53 Brady,54 and modern versions of Rule 1655) was still years in the
future, and even the early case of Mooney v. Holohan (1935) was viewed more
as an endgame move in a long-running political cause celebre than as the
starting point of modern criminal discovery.56 At Nuremberg, defendants were
permitted, upon motion, to examine documentary evidence in the hands of the
occupation authorities; in effect, given access to the prosecution’s principal
source of evidence.

TRIAL OF THE GERMANS 35 (1966). For the very different arrangements for Japanese and
American defense counsel at Tokyo, see PICCIGALLO, supra note 26, at 13-14; Solis Horwitz, The
Tokyo Trial, 28 INT’L CONCILIATION 473, 491-93 (No. 465, Nov. 1950); THE TOKYO WAR
CRIMES TRIAL: AN INTERNATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 93-94, 104, 119-21 (Chiro Hosoya, Nisuki
Andō, Yasuaki Ōnuma, Richard H. Minear eds., 1986).
51. For example, in the Medical case, Alfred Seidl defended three defendants and Hanns
Marx and Fritz Sauter each defended two more of the twenty-three defendants. In six other trials
(the Justice, Farben, Einsatz, Krupp, List and High Command cases), at least one principal
defense counsel had two and sometimes three clients. See TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note
28, at 297-344.
52. The version of Rule 16 in effect at the time permitted discovery upon motion, if the court
was satisfied the request was reasonable and the requested item material. In practice, however,
this was construed very narrowly, and normally the only items shown to defendant were
impounded documents taken from him. See LESTER B. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM
ARREST TO APPEAL 329-33 (1947).
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000). This is the so-called “Jencks Act”; it largely reversed Jencks v.
United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
54. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
55. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16.
56. Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935). Both Felix Frankfurter (as President
Wilson’s representative charged with preparing a presidential report on San Francisco bombing
and Tom Mooney’s trial) and Telford Taylor (as a young lawyer working on one of Mooney’s
final Supreme Court petitions in the mid-1930s), were familiar with Mooney and the problem of
willful government use of perjured testimony. FELIX FRANKFURTER, FELIX FRANKFURTER
REMINISCES 130-35 (1960) (Frankfurter’s participation); Telford Taylor, The Reminiscences of
Telford Taylor 237-38 (1956), (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Columbia University
Oral History Research Office) (Taylor’s participation). See, e.g., GERALD T. DUNNE, HUGO
BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION 200-01 (1977) (illustrating view of Mooney as about
federal supervision of state practice more than criminal discovery as such). The Taylor oral
history is cited with permission of the Estate of Telford Taylor, whom the author gratefully
acknowledges.
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To a defense lawyer, this sounds too good to be true, and it was. For one,
there is the familiar difficulty in this area of the law with requiring the defense
to move for evidence when it does not know what relevant documents the other
side has located and when a blanket request will not be honored. For another,
the Nuremberg prosecution was obliged to comment on defense production
requests, and the leading student of the matter has concluded that the
opportunity to comment and object significantly, but not surprisingly, impeded
defense discovery.57
The reason for this rule went beyond the usual desire of prosecutors to
keep an advantage at trial, and lay instead in the unique context of Nuremberg.
Never before, or since, had a modern bureaucratic state been completely
defeated such that its official documents, where not destroyed, were captured.
But captured did not mean catalogued. The volume of material was simply
staggering, and historians and archivists were combing, cataloguing and
inventorying the mountains of captured documents for years afterward. Teams
of researchers (some formally part of the prosecution staff, others attached to
other branches of the occupation authority or the War Department) were
required just to make sufficient progress in time for trial in identifying the
items culled for use as evidence. Often it was only happenstance that trolling
and sampling methods yielded crucial evidence. And beyond the captured
documents, the pretrial process itself also generated tens of thousands of
additional items, especially witness depositions. As a result, simplification and
streamlining were necessarily the practice. Prosecution staffers summarized
the documents, summaries that were later admitted into evidence along with
the underlying document or read to the court when the evidence was
introduced. As the staffers worked through the material to produce the
summaries, they generated in-house lists, cross-indices and other finding aids
from which defense counsel were able to browse and request discovery of
documents.
Then, midway through the trial program, the court modified its rules and
eliminated the prosecution’s privilege to comment on and block defense
document requests.58 From this point onward at least, defendants seemed to
have little trouble obtaining evidence. Indeed, defense counsel went on (courtpaid) document hunts to Frankfurt, Berlin and elsewhere, and government
repositories (branch offices of the Nuremberg document center, as well as
other government agencies) sent material to the Nuremberg defendants from
57. JOHN MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT: THE USE OF SEIZED DOCUMENTS IN THE
NUREMBERG PROCEEDINGS 109-11 (1988) (noting impediments to defense discovery during
second round of Nuremberg trials) [hereinafter MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT]; TAYLOR,
THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 627 (acknowledging defense lack of access to prosecution’s
documentary hoard during IMT, and explaining that many of the defense lawyers were long-time
and recent Nazis whose reliability with the documents was hardly to be assumed).
58. MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT, supra note 57, at 111.
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Berlin, Washington and Frankfurt. Of course not everything was available, but
the defendants seem to have located ample evidence, and the court panels were
not afraid to threaten the prosecution with discovery sanctions for failure to
comply. Defendants were able to pull together enough material that in most
cases, presentation of the defense case took longer than the prosecution case,
with more documents, witnesses and court days.59 It was a far cry from the
American plan to have speedy, summary, martial-law-style proceedings
without the full panoply of due process.
Not all due process rights were extended to or even contemplated for the
war crimes trials. In most cases, the reason was obvious from the context of a
newly pacified occupation zone, in which hundreds of thousands of culpable
Germans were not yet distinguishable from their millions of hungry, sullen
countrymen. Bail was irrelevant since the charges were capital and the risk of
flight presumably high. American limits on search and seizure, to the extent
that there were meaningful limits at home to state policing at the time, were
irrelevant to occupied Germany, where the Allies needed to swoop in and seize
weapons and fugitives, and where there were no neutral magistrates available
to screen warrants and probable cause affidavits. There was no right to
counsel during interrogation or when one was the focus of investigation, both
steps difficult to square with a hungry, rag-tag defense bar and an occupation
government that needed to know many things in a hurry. Jury trials would
have been laughable, allowing a single “twelfth angry Nazi” juror to acquit
even the worst perpetrator. The right to severance, to a trial uncontaminated
by a co-defendant, was also largely irrelevant, given that the prosecution
contemplated not an ongoing international or American trial program, but one
or at most a handful of trials in which all the defendants were well-known,
high-ranking figures and in which similarly situated defendants would be tried
together.
Perhaps most controversial was the unavailability of any right to appeal.
From the first, Justice Jackson had been adamant that there should be no
appellate tribunal to which defendants might appeal60 and that this was
consistent with American due process, under which, then and long after, there
was also no right to appeal.61 All three Allied delegations agreed: In the
59. See TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 88; MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY
DOCUMENT, supra note 57, at 114-17; 15 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 393-447
(offering examples of defense counsel being flown to archive repositories in other cities, large
quantities of documents being brought to Nuremberg, and court panels threatening sanctions
against the prosecution, such as threatening to draw adverse inferences about evidence subject to
discovery but not produced). See also id. at 909 (stating that defense counsel for General
Rendulic joined a site-visit to the scene of the alleged crime in Finnmark, northern Norway).
60. REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 161.
61. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20-22 (1956) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (rejecting “the
easy assumption that it [the right to appeal from a criminal conviction] is fundamental to the
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context of trials of a tiny number of notorious men who had dominated the
world stage for a dozen years, the need for appellate review of the quantum of
evidence seemed unnecessary. But convicted men were nevertheless given the
right to seek clemency and pardons, based on review of the evidence against
them, legal issues and their personal circumstances. This proved to be far
more valuable than appellate review. The clearest example was in the second
round of Nuremberg trials. In total, some 142 were convicted, with twenty-six
sentenced to death, only half of whom were actually executed. All others,
whether sentenced to death, life imprisonment or a long term of years, were
soon released. The convictions and sentences (except for those in the
Ministries Case, which was still continuing) were given a supposed final
review by the American Military Governor, General Lucius Clay, before his
departure in the spring of 1949.62 Then, in the years that followed, a series of
civilian supremos, American High Commissioners John J. McCloy, Walter
Donnelly and James Conant, re-reviewed every conviction. As early as 1952,
most convicted men were free, by August 1955, only seven prisoners
remained, and in 1958, the last prisoner was released.63 Needless to say, the
American clemency programs, and their counterpart in the British Zone, were
widely seen as political: motivated by West German pressure and Cold War
exigency.64 A Nuremberg critic might still insist that the defendants’ good
fortune was not the same as having enjoyed a legal right to appellate review.
Perhaps so, but one would be hard-pressed to show that any defendant would
have done better before an appellate tribunal than he did by relying on the
mercies of subsequent High Commissioners and their clemency boards.
Let me conclude this quick tour d’horizon by mentioning three instances of
due process in the war crimes programs: one indispensable, the second
shocking, and the third essentially eviscerating the entire program. The first
was the burden of proof at Nuremberg. Probably the cornerstone of all other
due process rights is the presumption of innocence until proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. Nowhere in Nuremberg planning documents was there
protection of life and liberty and therefore a necessary ingredient of due process of law,” stressing
“the fact that a State may deny the right of appeal altogether” and explaining the Court’s holding
as requiring only that if a state creates appellate avenues, it must do so consistent with the due
process and equal protection clauses).
62. TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 96.
63. See THOMAS ALAN SCHWARTZ, AMERICA’S GERMANY: JOHN J. MCCLOY AND THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 159-75 (1991); PETER H. MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN
AMERICAN STORY 205-82 (2001); FRANK M. BUSCHER, THE U.S. WAR CRIMES TRIAL
PROGRAM IN GERMANY, 1946-1955, at 54-153 (1989). One of the arguments advanced in
support of pardons and clemency was that Nuremberg was not a civil/common law hybrid, as
Taylor had insisted, but essentially an American court, to which American standards of
comparable, individualized, and merciful sentencing should apply. SCHWARTZ, supra note 63, at
354 n.2 (quoting McCloy as describing the trials as “justice American style”).
64. See, e.g., Telford Taylor, The Nazis Go Free, THE NATION, Feb. 24, 1951, at 170-72.
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any reference to burdens of proof, and there was no self-evident reason why a
rigorous burden of proof should be adopted—after all, it was not only the
Soviet delegates that kept asking whether the entire world did not know
enough already of the guilt of men like Hermann Goering. Yet in the end, in
both the first Nuremberg and later trials, defendants against whom damning
evidence was introduced were acquitted of some or even all charges. Some
defendants were acquitted despite adverse findings of fact because the court
felt there was legal impediment: Schacht because of lack of specific intent that
he made possible Hitler’s illegal rearmament for actual use in war; Doenitz
because of alleged ambiguity in the law of submarine warfare as understood by
the British Navy and the American Pacific Fleet; General Rendulic because of
his alleged perception of military exigency as he laid waste to northern
Norway in the winter of 1944-45; Generals Foertsch and Geitner because on a
flow-chart they were senior staff rather than line commanders when they
knowingly disseminated direct orders for Balkan atrocities.65 In each case, the
acquittals were in the teeth of strong evidence and of Allied pressure to
convict. But other defendants were acquitted solely and explicitly on burden
of proof grounds, with the court sometimes conceding the likelihood that a
defendant was guilty as charged. Thus, medical officials Ruff, Romberg, and
Weltz, and I.G. Farben defendants Lautenschlager, Mann, and Hoerlein were
fully acquitted of medical atrocities, and Milch acquitted of the medical
charges (but not of slave labor) solely because of the prosecution’s alleged
failure to meet its Anglo-American burden of proof, even though the court
charters did not require that level of proof.66
The second example of due process was the opening bombshell at the IMT
involving the indefinite postponement of one defendant’s case, even though
there was no textual requirement to do so. It had always been the Allied plan
to charge a representative defendant from German armaments and heavy
industry for illegally arming Hitler and enthusiastically participating in the
65. United States v. Goering (1946), published in NAZI CONSPIRACY AND AGGRESSION:
OPINION AND JUDGMENT 134-37 (Schacht acquittal); id. at 138-40 (Doenitz decision); id. at 156
(Speer acquittal of aggressive war) (1947) (“Red Series”); United States v. List, 11 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 757, 1281-88 (Foertsch and Geitner); id. at 1295-97
(Rendulic) (1948) (“Hostage Case”); TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 592-94
(evaluating Doenitz decision).
66. United States v. Goering, in OPINION AND JUDGMENT, supra note 65, at 137 (Schacht
acquittal based on possibility of reasonable doubt); TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at
592 (Schacht); United States v. Brandt, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 272-77
(1947) (Ruff, Romberg and Weltz); United States v. Milch, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra
note 36, at 773-79 (1947); United States v. Krauch, 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36,
at 1168-72, 1195 (1948) (the “Farben Case”) (acquittal of the three Farben officials of medical
atrocities and other charges); Telford Taylor, Nuremberg Trials: War Crimes and International
Law, 27 INT’L CONCILIATION 241 (No. 450, Apr. 1949), reprinted in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT,
supra note 28, at 165-66, 212.
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“aryanization” of German Jewish property in the 1930s and spoliation and
massive use of slave labor across Europe in the 1940s.67 Eventually the Allies
decided to charge, at least in this first trial, Gustav Krupp, chief of the
notorious Krupp firm until he stepped aside in favor of his son in 1941. On the
eve of trial, it was learned that the elderly Krupp was in poor health and
mentally incompetent. There was no provision in the London Agreement or
the IMT rules for handling of incompetent defendants, and there was strong
Allied pressure to try Herr Krupp anyway; after all, he would be represented
by counsel, and an evidentiary record could be established. The court would
hear nothing of it. It severed Krupp’s case and brusquely rejected various
prosecution pleas to substitute Krupp’s son, who had managed the company at
the time when it sought out and relied on slave labor. Traditional common
(and civil) law rules about incompetent defendants were found to apply, just as
they did at home.68 In doing so, the Tribunal gave hope to the other
Nuremberg defendants that it really intended to be fair.69
The final example was one that, in a real sense, sacrificed the entire
American plan for Nuremberg in favor of due process. Briefly, a key feature,
to some planners the crucial feature, of the American plan was that the first
proceedings should try not only a few individual defendants, but also culpable
Nazi organizations such as the Gestapo, and through that address the problem
of the hundreds of thousands of other culpable Germans. The plan was that
those organizations would have counsel, the presumption of innocence, the
right to introduce and challenge evidence, and all other rights of individual
defendants.
But once found guilty as entities, their members could
subsequently be tried by use of familiar American legal tools like criminal
conspiracy and membership in a criminal organization. It was expected that
these later trials would be quick and summary affairs, in which the historical
case was already made and where the only question was whether a defendant
had been a knowing member or party to a criminal conspiracy.70 But when it
came time for the judges to deliberate this American feature of the trial, the
American chief judge, former Attorney General Francis Biddle, and his legal

67. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 91-94, 151-59.
68. Standard doctrine of the day was summed up by Sheldon Glueck, also a key behind-thescenes architect of the first Nuremberg trial. See, e.g., SHELDON GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: A STUDY IN MEDICO-SOCIOLOGICAL JURISPRUDENCE 47-86 (1925);
LIVINGSTON HALL & SHELDON GLUECK, CASES ON CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 318
(1951).
69. ANN TUSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 140 (1983).
70. Control Council Law No. 10 allowed the possibility of charging defendants in
subsequent international trials such as the American Nuremberg or the French Rastatt
proceedings with membership in an organization declared criminal in the first Nuremberg trial.
Art. II, § 1(d), cited in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 250, and discussed in TAYLOR,
THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 36.
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aides, chiefly former Assistant Attorney General and Professor Herbert
Wechsler, would have nothing of it. They rightly foresaw the dangers to due
process of group guilt and convictions based on passive membership rather
than acts.
The result was that count one (conspiracy), the heart of the American
presentation and the part of the case chief prosecutor Jackson had reserved for
himself, was more or less collapsed into insignificance at the first Nuremberg
trial.71 Conspiracy was interpreted narrowly, and additional elements of
specific intent were read into both the conspiracy and aggressive war charges,
leading to the acquittal of defendant Schacht and in the later trials to the
acquittal of Alfried Krupp (the son) and the board and senior management of
both his firm and I.G. Farben on charges of aggressive war-making.72 Overall,
only eight defendants were convicted of conspiracy in either the first or second
Nuremberg trial program, though many more had been charged.73
As for the six organizational defendants, the groups whose members were
supposed to be amenable to summary disposition afterward, some were
acquitted, and for the others it was held that participation or membership had
to be not only knowing and willing but active.74 The prospect of later trials of
members of criminal organizations, even the three organizations convicted at
the IMT, thus came to nothing. Aside from uniformed senior officials in the
three SS trials at Nuremberg, only a few defendants in the later Nuremberg
trials were convicted for membership at high levels of the SS. In all but three
of even these few cases, membership was an additional charge to grave crimes
against humanity, and the additional sentences were trivial.75 There were no
71. United States v. Goering, in OPINION AND JUDGMENT, supra note 67, at 56; SMITH,
supra note 50, at 121-22, 134-37. For criticisms of conspiracy liability from the Tokyo Tribunal,
see the views of Webb (President, concurring) and Bernard (J., dissenting), cited in PICCIGALLO,
supra note 26, at 28-29; Horwitz, supra note 50, at 554.
72. United States v. Goering, in OPINION AND JUDGMENT, supra note 65, at 136 (1946)
(Schacht judgment); United States v. Krauch, 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at
1211-1306 (Hebert, J., concurring in part); United States v. Krupp, 9 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 396-98 (1948); Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, in FINAL REPORT, supra
note 28, at 191-92 (consequences of Schacht acquittal).
73. Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, in FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 226-29.
74. TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 555-58, 587; SMITH, supra note 50, at 116,
161-65.
75. United States v. Brandt, 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 248-63
(conviction of Poppendick and Sievers for SS membership; Sievers also convicted of capital
crimes against humanity); United States v. Flick, 6 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at
1223 (1948) (conviction of Steinbrinck on membership and other charges, petty sentence); United
States v. Krauch, 8 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 1196-1204 (acquittal of three
defendants Schneider, Buetefisch, and von der Heyde of SS membership); United States v.
Alstoetter, 3 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 1171-79, 1201 (1947) (the “Justice
Case”) (membership conviction only of defendant Alstoetter; five years); Taylor, Nuremberg
Trials, in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 165, 174-85, 187, 189 n.170, 196 n.187.
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separate membership trials, summary or not, for the hundreds of thousands of
active, knowing, willing members whom Jackson or his successor General
Telford Taylor had mentioned as potential defendants. It was a triumph for
due process. Indeed, it was a measure of due process we were unwilling to
apply at home a few years later,76 and it came at the cost of any significant
criminal trial program for hundreds of thousands of Nazi participants.

Senior SS personnel in another SS case who were acquitted of other charges and convicted of
high-level active membership were sentenced merely to time served. See United States v.
Greifelt, 5 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 157, 158, 164, 165, 166-67 (1948) (five
defendants in the SS-race or “RuSHA Case”); United States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 TRIALS OF
WAR CRIMES, supra note 36, at 865-66 (1949) (the “Ministries Case”) (defendant Bohle
sentenced to five years, but only one more to serve). In one other SS case, one defendant, Ruehl,
was given a significant sentence for membership, while another, Graf, was sentenced only to time
served. United States v. Ohlendorf, 4 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 581, 587,
589 (1948) (the “Einsatzgruppen Case”); Taylor, Nuremberg Trials, in TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT,
supra note 28, at 179, 184 n.156. In other instances, the Tribunal read an element of scienter into
membership liability, and accordingly acquitted of a membership charge defendants who were
willing, voluntary senior members of the SS. See, e.g., United States v. Pohl, 5 TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 1018, 1061-62 (1947) (acquittal of Scheide and Klein); United
States v. von Weizsaecker, 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS, supra note 36, at 857 (acquittal of
von Weizsaecker and Woermann despite their membership). Thus, only three defendants,
Poppendick, Alstoetter and Ruehl, were punished according to Bernays’ original plan of using
membership to facilitate punishment of senior leaders of the worst groups against whom
individual atrocities could not be shown, and only after exhaustive rather than summary proof.
TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 36.
76. See REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON, supra note 27, at 112; TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY,
supra note 30, at 54, 74 (giving far higher estimates for the number of culpable participants). A
few years later, at the depths of the Red Scare, the United States was less hesitant at home to use
theories of membership liability. Apparently various officials thought of bringing a test case
under the “membership” clause of the Smith Act, which by the post-war years was read to
proscribe the Communist Party and its related entities. Until this point, the act had been
understood to criminalize only knowing membership. The new prosecution sought to establish a
precedent for charging “mere members,” for the defendant here was the first defendant charged
only under the membership clause of the Smith Act and not with an additional conspiracy count.
Selected for the honor was Junius Scales, whose case was tried in the presumably receptive
confines of a Southern courtroom and whose conviction was quickly affirmed in an opinion by
Nuremberg alternate judge, Fourth Circuit Judge John Parker. When Scales sought Supreme
Court counsel, many of the best-known liberal lawyers turned him down. But eventually he made
his way to Nuremberg judge Francis Biddle, by then retired from practice, who referred Scales to
Nuremberg prosecutor Telford Taylor. For Taylor, the case became a seven-year crusade, to no
avail. After retrials and further appeals, Scales was convicted, on proof that would have failed
before the Nuremberg tribunal. See Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Telford Taylor,
Foreword to JUNIUS SCALES AND RICHARD NICKSON, CAUSE AT HEART: A FORMER
COMMUNIST REMEMBERS 290-94 (1987); TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 558; Mark
A. Sheft, The End of the Smith Act Era: A Legal and Historical Analysis of Scales v. United
States, 36 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 164 (1992).
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IV. CONCLUSION
From the foregoing sketch, one might infer either that the international war
crimes trials were perfectly fair or that the author believes they were. Neither
of course is the case. Justice Jackson attempted to push the bounds of fair
notice when he sought to substitute Krupp junior as a defendant for Krupp
senior, and similar errors of law or judgment could be shown in almost every
trial. Some of these excesses the tribunals saw and rebuffed, others they did
not, and a few they initiated. Lines of defense were denied and proposed
witnesses rejected. The selection of defendants was sometimes haphazard and,
in the end, a few defendants who probably should have been acquitted were
found guilty.77 For them, it was no consolation that the courts had erred for
others so far on the side of leniency.
German observers criticized the trials freely at the time, often writing in
the German-language Swiss press. They denounced almost every aspect of the
trials, from the unfamiliarity of the common law procedure to the novelty of
the substantive charges and the tribunal itself, Soviet participation, the Soviet
allegations about the Katyn Forest massacre, the participation as judges and
chief prosecutors of men who had been London delegates establishing the
court, and Allied refusal to use German courts or judges.78 Japanese critics
pointed to many of the same faults, and added their outrage at perceived
American criminality for use of nuclear weapons.79 More recently, criticism of
Nuremberg was reawakened in the past decade by proponents of the ad hoc
international criminal tribunals for former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and of the
possible permanent international criminal court. These recent proponents
seemed to have a distinct rhetorical strategy for handling the Nuremberg trials.
On one hand, they held the fact of Nuremberg to be a good thing, proving that
international trials are effective and can be conducted with basic fairness. On
the other, in the early 1990s proponents enthusiastically catalogued the alleged
deficiencies of Nuremberg, in those long years before there was a Hague
tribunal and then when there were no defendants and no trials. The implication
was almost of competition, that a new team would break the record of the old.
Legal study groups were convened and reports issued criticizing such
Nuremberg features as the death penalty, in absentia proceedings (against
Martin Bormann), the lack of explicit attention to gender crimes, and the lack
of neutral judges—as if there were neutral nations at the end of a world war

77. See, e.g., TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 153-59 (Jackson’s overreaching
with Krupp); id. at 562 (Streicher overconvicted); id. at 631 (haphazard process for selection of
defendants).
78. A translated sample of this literature can be found in NUREMBERG: GERMAN VIEWS OF
THE WAR TRIALS (Wilbourn E. Benton & Georg Grimm eds., 1955).
79. Reactions of this sort can be sampled, albeit at a four-decade distance, in THE TOKYO
WAR CRIMES TRIAL, supra note 50, passim.
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aside from Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, hardly models of arm’s length
neutrality.
Much of the criticism, then and now, is mistaken. A real-world criminal
lawyer might dismiss it by saying that a court that acquits defendants because
it feels the law compels that result, defendants against whom the evidence is
strong and whose conviction both political leaders and the public strongly
want, must know a bit about the rule of law. Either way, the effort to evaluate
previous tribunals and give them passing or failing grades is formalistic and
misplaced. The more interesting question is to ask of contemporaries
according to their own stated standards why they made the choices they did.
This essay has tried to suggest that the largely American architects of the
Nuremberg and related international tribunals aimed at holding basically fair
trials. Rather than grade their performance or hand out gold stars or demerits, I
close by asking why these American lawyers held themselves to so much
higher a legal standard when overseas in Germany than they did at home. At
home, there was no suggestion that due process or basic fairness meant
securing the best counsel from the private bar or outside experts for indigents
or that defense counsel should observe prosecution witness interviews or have
broad access to documents. Why such efforts abroad, at a time when federal
courts at home took only infrequent steps to ensure the fairness of state
investigatory and trial practices?
At first glance, the answer seems easy. The whole world was watching the
war crimes trials, especially at the beginning, as the Allies knew. Publicity and
self-consciousness are wonderful spurs to reform. Right around this time,
many Americans began to realize that the world was also watching domestic
police practices, particularly against African-Americans in the Deep South.
But the heat from that spotlight never stayed too long, and was felt only after
particular lynchings or show trials. Otherwise, Southern policing was part of
the larger American dilemma about race, and it was a long time before change
came.
For similar reasons, public attention can never be the whole answer for the
conduct of the war crimes trials, for they too were never in the spotlight for
that long. Trials could never compete with glitzier entertainment fare, and
even the serious public was probably more interested in what had brought the
world to ruin, what the Nazis did, rather than in what the Allies were saying
about it after the war was over. Rebecca West surely overstated matters in her
famous description of the extravagant boredom at Nuremberg in the spring of
1946,80 but few trials can stay in the public eye for long, especially complex
trials built on documents. Today’s international criminal tribunal in The
Hague learned this years ago when Court TV stopped its gavel-to-gavel
80. Rebecca West, Greenhouse with Cyclamens I (1946), originally in A TRAIN OF POWDER
11 (1955), excerpted in REBECCA WEST: A CELEBRATION 245 (1977).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

538

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:515

coverage after the first few months of the first trial. In its day, the IMT was
among the longest criminal trials in either British or American legal history,
and the Ministries Case (last of the second round of Nuremberg trials) and the
Tokyo trial were each longer still. With proof in all three cases based on the
introduction of tens of thousands of documents, none was likely to stay in the
public eye after the first few weeks, and they did not.
So beyond the real need to meet the standards of the American public, the
legal community, the victim peoples of Europe, and the wary Germans, there
were likely other reasons that the participants of Nuremberg were willing to
work with the discipline of a due process regime. For one thing, they could
afford to do so. The Nuremberg programs had resources—fiscal, physical and
political—while ordinary criminal processes at home were chronically
underfunded. Funds were not unlimited, and every account of the British
delegation at the IMT and Taylor’s subsequent Nuremberg trials shows that
funds were watched carefully and measured slowly. But there were sufficient
funds for lawyers, mimeograph facilities and plane flights to interview
witnesses, enough for the defense as well as the prosecution.
Additionally, trials of the worst of the vanquished enemy brought out the
idealism in many Nuremberg participants. Even after the joy of VE-Day had
faded, after the chill of the Cold War was in the air and the news from home
was of unheroic things like inflation and strikes, in Germany the few who
stayed on were doing important work, or so it still felt to many. Like other
aspects of the American occupation, trials were felt to be part of an American
trusteeship, to be discharged properly, and an historic opportunity, the conduct
of which would be watched and judged. Crime control at home, by contrast,
was not an historic opportunity but hard inevitability, offering little outlet for
idealism.
Back at home, a Supreme Court frustrated by the intractability of both
crime and police abuse could comfort itself with the knowledge that the federal
structure seemed to preclude systematic federal oversight of state policing and
trials. In fact, this respect for or distance from state practice was built into the
notion of constitutional due process. Jurists applying due process tests that
relied on the fundamental elements in the Anglo-American tradition saw that
the need for productive interrogation—not coerced, but certainly interrogation
not cluttered up or impeded by the presence of counsel—was part of the
American tradition of policing as well.81 In defining due process for the war
crimes trials, Justice Jackson and his staff and successors were writing on a
blank slate and could afford a due process that was more capacious, better
funded, and less limited by federalism, lax precedent, and the ongoing needs of
street policing.
81. Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 156-62 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting, with
Roberts and Frankfurter, JJ.), rev’g retrial, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).
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Not least, there was also class bias in the allocation of due process. The
German defendants were not lowly ethnic street hoodlums like Malinski or his
co-defendant Rudish, but figures from the world stage. It is difficult to
imagine “third-degree” or prolonged nude interrogation being applied to such
olympian figures as Friedrich Flick and Alfried Krupp, the captains of German
industry and recently among the wealthiest men in Europe; to Field Marshals
von List or von Leeb, perceived legatees of the feared Prussian military
tradition; or to proud, educated, articulate mandarins like Hjalmar Schacht or
Ernst von Weizsaecker. Doubtless there were instances of abuse, especially in
the first weeks after the defendants’ capture.82 But many Allied participants
felt awe as well as contempt for the defendants.83
Last, the extension of full due process rights to the defendants may have
appeared to the Nuremberg tribunals to offer a win-win situation, especially for
those panels that increasingly adopted a sympathetic view of the imposing
defendants from the higher reaches of German finance, industry, the military
and the diplomatic corps. After all, against the most repulsive killers, like SS
leader Kaltenbrunner and the Einsatzgruppen leaders, there was ample
documentary evidence, and no amount of lawyering could help them. As for
the elite defendants, their top-flight lawyers would show the court that their
clients were not as guilty as it seemed, clarifying this bit of momentary
misunderstanding, as it were, as with Schacht. Failing that, counsel would at
least explain to the court some of the allegedly important context that mitigated
their clients’ guilt and showed them to have responded with as much humanity
as one could expect under difficult circumstances, as with Flick, Albert Speer
82. Instances of petty abuse are cited in MENDELSOHN, TRIAL BY DOCUMENT, supra note
59, at 17; TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 62. Graver allegations were made about the
administration of Landsburg Prison, where the American occupation authorities housed both
Nuremberg and other war crimes prisoners. From time to time there were investigations into the
complaints, but no evidence was found to support them. TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28,
at 97-98. Outside of German ultra-nationalist circles, few of these allegations were taken
seriously. The exception was the international furor over claims that American military police
and interrogators had brutalized the German soldiers arrested and later convicted for their role in
the Malmedy Massacre, in which SS units had murdered American POWs captured in the Battle
of the Bulge. The Senate investigated these allegations, led by freshman Sen. Joe McCarthy.
Like his later efforts, the hearings proved little, but they gave time for conservative German and
American opinion to mobilize. Eventually the convicted men were not hanged but given
clemency, and the last was released in 1956. See, e.g., Malmedy Massacre Investigation,
Investigation of Action of Army with Respect to Trial of Persons Responsible for the Massacre of
American Soldiers, Battle of the Bulge, near Malmedy, Belgium, December 1944, Hearings
before a Subcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, 81st Cong. 1st Sess. (Apr.-June 1949, Sept.
1949) (pursuant to S. Res. 42, 2 parts); Nathan Glazer, The Method of Senator McCarthy: Its
Origins, Its Uses, and Its Prospects, 15 COMMENTARY 244-56 (March 1953); MAGUIRE, supra
note 63, at 260-71.
83. Some voices back home also called for an end of the trials of such distinguished
Germans. See TAYLOR, FINAL REPORT, supra note 28, at 83-84.
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and others. Either way, the perception was that with defendants who were
either so guilty or caught in a difficult spot, and with the truth seemingly there
in objective documents, there was no cost to a generous understanding of due
process rights.
Whatever the mix of motives and reasons, the incongruous result was that
free-standing due process was understood more broadly and applied more
generously in occupation Germany than at home in precisely those years
between the Supreme Court’s first steady interest in state police and trial
practices and the sudden onrush twenty years later of the due process
revolution. Due process is a phrase, a mere formula, and taken out of the
constraints of the Twining84-Palko85 and federalist tradition, it could be potent
indeed. It is unlikely that Rudish, the Jewish co-defendant of Malinski whose
conviction was sustained, appreciated the irony of our broad understanding of
extraterritorial due process, any more than Admiral Dewey Adamson may have
been interested to know that his case had prompted Justice Black’s celebrated
dissent.

84. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), cited in Malinski, 324 U.S. at 414.
85. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), cited in Malinski, 324 U.S. at 414.

